

IMPEACHMENT

SELECTED MATERIALS

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

HENRY J. HYDE, *Chairman*



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
Foreword

BY HON. HENRY J. HYDE, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY

The resolution of fundamental issues of public debate is always enhanced when wide segments of the American public become concerned and informed.

In recent months, the Committee on the Judiciary has daily received numerous requests for information regarding the constitutional and procedural bases for the impeachment of civil officers of the United States. For that reason, and to promote familiarity with a critical area of American law, I am pleased to transmit this document as a committee print.

It is my hope that these materials will be more readily accessible to Members of Congress and to a larger segment of the American community.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Henry J. Hyde". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large, prominent "H" and "Y".

HENRY J. HYDE.

November 3, 1998.

Provisions of the United States Constitution Regarding the Matter of Impeachment

The following provisions of the United States Constitution apply specifically to impeachment:

Article I; Section 2, clause 5

"The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power of Impeachment."

Article I; Section 3, clauses 6 and 7

"The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be in Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

"Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law."

Article II; Section 2, clause 1

"The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in cases of Impeachment."

Article II; Section 4

"The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

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**IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES**

ARTICLE I

In his conduct of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice, in that:

On June 17, 1972, and prior thereto, agents of the Committee for the Re-election of the President committed unlawful entry of the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee in Washington, District of Columbia, for the purpose of securing political intelligence. Subsequent thereto, Richard M. Nixon, using the powers of his high office, engaged personally and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede, and obstruct the investigation of such unlawful entry; to cover up, conceal and protect those responsible; and to conceal the existence and scope of other unlawful covert activities.

The means used to implement this course of conduct or plan included one or more of the following:

(1) making or causing to be made false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States;

(2) withholding relevant and material evidence or information from lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States;

(3) approving, condoning, acquiescing in, and counseling witnesses with respect to the giving of false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States and false or misleading testimony in duty instituted judicial and congressional proceedings;

(4) interfering or endeavoring to interfere with the conduct of investigations by the Department of Justice of the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, and Congressional Committees;

(5) approving, condoning, and acquiescing in, the surreptitious payment of substantial sums of money for the purpose of obtaining the silence or influencing the testimony of witnesses, potential witnesses or individuals who participated in such unlawful entry and other illegal activities;

(6) endeavoring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency, an agency of the United States;

(7) disseminating information received from officers of the Department of Justice of the United States to subjects of investigations conducted by lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States, for the purpose of aiding and assisting such subjects in their attempts to avoid criminal liability;

(8) making false or misleading public statements for the purpose of deceiving the people of the United States into believing that a thorough and complete investigation had been conducted with respect to allegations of misconduct on the part of personnel of the executive branch of the United States and personnel of the Committee for the Re-election of the President, and that there was no involvement of such personnel in such misconduct; or

(9) endeavoring to cause prospective defendants, and individuals duly tried and convicted, to expect favored treatment and consideration in return for their silence or false testimony, or rewarding individuals for their silence or false testimony.

In all of this, Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

Wherefore Richard M. Nixon, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

ARTICLE II

Using the powers of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in disregard of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has repeatedly engaged in conduct violating the constitutional rights of citizens, impairing the due and proper administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, or contravening the laws governing agencies of the executive branch and the purposes of these agencies.

This conduct has included one or more of the following:

(1) He has, acting personally and through his subordinates and agents, endeavored to obtain from the Internal Revenue Service, in violation of the constitutional rights of citizens, confidential information contained in income tax returns for purposes not authorized by law, and to cause, in violation of the constitutional rights of citizens, income tax audits or other income tax investigations to be initiated or conducted in a discriminatory manner.

(2) He misused the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and other executive personnel, in violation or disregard of the constitutional rights of citizens, by directing or authorizing such agencies or personnel to conduct or continue electronic surveillance or other investigations for purposes unrelated to national security, the enforcement of laws, or any other lawful function of his office; he did direct, authorize, or permit the use of information obtained thereby for purposes unrelated to national security, the enforcement of laws, or any

other lawful function of his office; and he did direct the concealment of certain records made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of electronic surveillance.

(3) He has, acting personally and through his subordinates and agents, in violation or disregard of the constitutional rights of citizens, authorized and permitted to be maintained a secret investigative unit within the office of the President, financed in part with money derived from campaign contributions, which unlawfully utilized the resources of the Central Intelligence Agency, engaged in covert and unlawful activities, and attempted to prejudice the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial.

(4) He has failed to take care that the laws were faithfully executed by failing to act when he knew or had reason to know that his close subordinates endeavored to impede and frustrate lawful inquiries by duly constituted executive, judicial, and legislative entities concerning the unlawful entry into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, and the cover-up thereof, and concerning other unlawful activities, including those relating to the confirmation of Richard Kleindienst as Attorney General of the United States, the electronic surveillance of private citizens, the break-in into the offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, and the campaign financing practices of the Committee to Re-elect the President.

(5) In disregard of the rule of law, he knowingly misused the executive power by interfering with agencies of the executive branch, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Criminal Division, and the Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, of the Department of Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency, in violation of his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

In all of this, Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

Wherefore Richard M. Nixon, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

ARTICLE III

In his conduct of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, contrary to his oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has failed without lawful cause or excuse to produce papers, and things as directed by duly authorized subpoenas issued by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on April 11, 1974, May 15, 1974, May 30, 1974, and June 24, 1974, and willfully disobeyed such subpoenas. The subpoenaed papers and things were deemed necessary by the Committee in order to resolve by direct evidence fundamental, factual questions relating to Presidential direction, knowledge, or approval of actions demonstrated by other evidence to be substantial grounds for impeachment of the President. In refusing to produce

these papers and things, Richard M. Nixon, substituting his judgment as to what materials were necessary for the inquiry, interposed the powers of the Presidency against the lawful subpoenas of the House of Representatives, thereby assuming to himself functions and judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole power of impeachment vested by the Constitution in the House of Representatives.

In all of this, Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice, and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

Wherefore Richard M. Nixon, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE HARRY E. CLAIBORNE

ARTICLE I

That Judge Harry E. Claiborne, having been nominated by the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of the United States, and while serving as a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, was and is guilty of misbehavior and of high crimes and misdemeanors in office in a manner and form as follows:

On or about June 15, 1980, Judge Harry E. Claiborne did willfully and knowingly make and subscribe a United States Individual Income Tax Return for the calendar year 1979, while return was verified by a written declaration that the return was made under penalties of perjury; which return was filed with the Internal Revenue Service; and which return Judge Harry E. Claiborne did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter in that the return reported total income in the amount of \$80,227.04 whereas, as he then and there well knew and believed, he received and failed to report substantial income in addition to that stated on the return in violation of section 7206(1) of title 26, United States Code.

The facts set forth in the foregoing paragraph were found beyond a reasonable doubt by a twelve-person jury in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.

Wherefore, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was and is guilty of misbehavior and was and is guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor and, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial and removal from office.

ARTICLE II

That Judge Harry E. Claiborne, having been nominated by the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of the United States, and while serving as a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, was and is guilty of misbehavior and of high crimes and misdemeanors in office in a manner and form as follows:

On or about June 15, 1981, Judge Harry E. Claiborne did willfully and knowingly make and subscribe a United States Individual Income Tax Return for the calendar year 1980, which return was verified by a written declaration that the return was made under penalties of perjury; which return was filed with the Internal Revenue Service; and which return Judge Harry E. Claiborne did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter in that the return reported total income in the amount of \$54,251 whereas, as he then and there well knew and believed, he received and failed to report substantial income in addition to that stated on the

return in violation of section 7206(1) of title 26, United States Code.

The facts set forth in the foregoing paragraph were found beyond a reasonable doubt by a twelve-person jury in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.

Wherefore, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was and is guilty of misbehavior and was and is guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor and, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial and removal from office.

ARTICLE III

That Judge Harry E. Claiborne, having been nominated by the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of the United States, and while serving as a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, was and is guilty of misbehavior and of high crimes in office in a manner and form as follows:

On August 10, 1984, in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was found guilty by a twelve-person jury of making and subscribing a false income tax return for the calendar years 1979 and 1980 in violation of section 7206(1) of title 26, United States Code.

Thereafter, a judgment of conviction was entered against Judge Harry E. Claiborne for each of the violations of section 7206(1) of title 26, United States Code, and a sentence of two years imprisonment for each violation was imposed, to be served concurrently, together with a fine of \$5000 for each violation.

Wherefore, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was and is guilty of misbehavior and was and is guilty of high crimes.

ARTICLE IV

That Judge Harry E. Claiborne, having been nominated by the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of the United States, and while serving as a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, was and is guilty of misbehavior and of misdemeanors in office in a manner and form as follows:

Judge Harry E. Claiborne took the oath for the office of judge of the United States and is required to discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on him and to uphold and obey the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Judge Harry E. Claiborne, by virtue of his office, is required to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to perform the duties of his office impartially.

Judge Harry E. Claiborne, by willfully and knowingly falsifying his income on his Federal tax returns for 1979 and 1980, has betrayed the trust of the people of the United States and reduced confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, thereby bringing disrepute on the Federal courts and the administration of justice by the courts.

Wherefore, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was and is guilty of misbehavior and was and is guilty of misdemeanors and, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial and removal from office.

IMPEACHMENT OF ALCEE L. HASTINGS

ARTICLE I

From some time in the first half of 1981 and continuing through October 9, 1981, Judge Hastings and William Borders, then a Washington, D.C. attorney, engaged in a corrupt conspiracy to obtain \$150,000 from defendants in United States v. Romano, a case tried before Judge Hastings, in return for the imposition of sentences which would not require incarceration of the defendants.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE II

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to that oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance, that Judge Hastings and William Borders, of Washington, D.C., never made any agreement to solicit a bribe from defendants in United States v. Romano, a case tried before Judge Hastings.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE III

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to that oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance, that Judge Hastings never agreed with William Borders, of Washington, D.C., to modify the sentences of defendants in United States v. Romano, a case tried before Judge Hastings, from a term in the Federal penitentiary to probation in return for a bribe from those defendants.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE IV

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to that oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance, that Judge Hastings never agreed with William Borders, of Washington, D.C., in connection with a payment on a bribe, to enter an order returning a substantial amount of property to the defendants in *United States v. Romano*, a case tried before Judge Hastings. Judge Hastings had previously ordered that property forfeited.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE V

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to that oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance, that Judge Hastings' appearance at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami Beach, Florida, on September 16, 1981, was not part of a plan to demonstrate his participation in a bribery scheme with William Borders of Washington, D.C., concerning *United States v. Romano*, a case tried before Judge Hastings, and that Judge Hastings expected to meet Mr. Borders at that place and on that occasion.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE VI

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to that oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance, that Judge Hastings did not expect William Borders of Washington, D.C., to appear in Judge Hastings' room in the Sheraton Hotel in Washington, D.C., on September 12, 1981.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE VII

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary

to his oath, make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement concerned Judge Hastings' motive for instructing a law clerk, Jeffrey Miller, to prepare an order on October 5, 1981, in *United States v. Romano*, a case tried before Judge Hastings, returning a substantial portion of property previously ordered forfeited by Judge Hastings. Judge Hastings stated in substance that he so instructed, Mr. Miller primarily because Judge Hastings was concerned that the order would not be completed before, Mr. Miller's scheduled departure, when in fact the instruction on October 5, 1981, to prepare such order was in furtherance of a bribery scheme concerning that case.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE VIII

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to his oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance, that Judge Hastings' October 5, 1981, telephone conversation with William Borders, of Washington, D.C., was in fact about writing letters to solicit assistance for Hemphill Pride of Columbia, South Carolina, when in fact it was a coded conversation in furtherance of a conspiracy with Mr. Borders to solicit a bribe from defendants in *United States v. Romano*, a case tried before Judge Hastings.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings, is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE IX

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to his oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance, that three documents that purported to be drafts of letters to assist Hemphill Pride, of Columbia, South Carolina, had been written by Judge Hastings on October 5, 1981, and were the letters referred to by Judge Hastings in his October 5, 1981, telephone conversation with William Borders, of Washington, D.C.

Wherefore, Judge L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE X

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to that oath, make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance, that on May 5, 1981, Judge Hastings talked to Hemphill Pride by placing a telephone call to 803-758-8825 in Columbia, South Carolina.

Wherefore, Judge L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE XI

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to that oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance that on August 2, 1981, Judge Hastings talked to Hemphill Pride by placing a telephone call to 803-782-9387 in Columbia, South Carolina.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE XII

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to that oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance that on August 2, 1981, Judge Hastings talked to Hemphill Pride by placing a telephone call to 803-758-8825 in Columbia, South Carolina.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE XIII

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to that oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance, that 803-777-7716 was a telephone number at a place where Hemphill Pride could be contacted in July 1981.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE XIV

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to that oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact.

The false statement was, in substance, that on the afternoon of October 9, 1981, Judge Hastings called his mother and Patricia Williams from his hotel room at the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel in Washington, D.C.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE XV

From January 18, 1983, until February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In the course of the trial of that case, Judge Hastings, while under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, did knowingly and contrary to that oath make a false statement which was intended to mislead the trier of fact concerning his motives for taking a plane on October 9, 1981, from Baltimore-Washington International Airport rather than from Washington National Airport.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE XVI

From July 15, 1985, to September 15, 1985, Judge Hastings was the supervising judge of a wiretap instituted under chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code (added by title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968). The wiretap was part of certain investigations then being conducted by law enforcement agents of the United States.

As supervising judge, Judge Hastings learned highly confidential information obtained through the wiretap. The documents disclosing this information, presented to Judge Hastings as the supervising judge, were Judge Hastings' sole source of the highly confidential information.

On September 6, 1985, Judge Hastings revealed highly confidential information that he learned as the supervising judge on the wiretap, as follows: On the morning of September 6, 1985, Judge Hastings told Stephen Clark, the Mayor of Dade County, Florida, to stay away from Kevin "Waxy" Gordon, who was "hot" and was using the Mayor's name in Hialeah, Florida.

As a result of this improper disclosure, certain investigations then being conducted by law enforcement agents of the United States were thwarted and ultimately terminated.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

ARTICLE XVII

Judge Hastings, who as a Federal judge is required to enforce and obey the Constitution and laws of the United States, to uphold the integrity of the judiciary, to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, and to perform the duties of his office impartially, did through—

(1) a corrupt relationship with William Borders of Washington, D.C.;

(2) repeated false testimony under oath at Judge Hastings' criminal trial;

(3) fabrication of false documents which were submitted as evidence at his criminal trial; and

(4) improper disclosure of confidential information acquired by him as supervisory judge of a wiretap;

undermine confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and betray the trust of the people of the United States, thereby bringing disrepute on the Federal courts and the administration of justice by the Federal courts.

Wherefore, Judge Alcee L. Hastings is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.

IMPEACHMENT OF WALTER L. NIXON, JR.

ARTICLE I

On July 18, 1984, Judge Nixon testified before a Federal grand jury empaneled in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi (Hattiesburg Division) to investigate Judge Nixon's business relationship with Wiley Fairchild and the handling of the criminal prosecution of Fairchild's son, Drew Fairchild, for drug smuggling. In the course of his grand jury testimony and having duly taken an oath that he would tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, Judge Nixon did knowingly and contrary to his oath make a material false or misleading statement to the grand jury.

The false or misleading statement was, in substance, that Forrest County District Attorney Paul Holmes never discussed the Drew Fairchild case with Judge Nixon.

Wherefore, Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., is guilty of an impeachment offense and should be removed from office.

ARTICLE II

On July 18, 1984, Judge Nixon testified before a Federal grand jury empaneled in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi to investigate Judge Nixon's businesses relationship with Wiley Fairchild and the handling of the prosecution of Fairchild's son, Drew Fairchild, for drug smuggling. In the course of his grand jury testimony and having duly taken an oath that he would tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, Judge Nixon did knowingly and contrary to his oath make a material false or misleading statement to the grand jury.

The false or misleading statement was, in substance, that Judge Nixon had nothing whatsoever officially or unofficially to do with the Drew Fairchild case in Federal court or State court; and that Judge Nixon "never handled any part of it, never had a thing to do with it at all, and never talked to anyone, State or Federal, prosecutor or judge, in any way influence anybody" with respect to the Drew Fairchild case.

Wherefore, Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., is guilty of an impeachable offense and should be removed from office.

ARTICLE III

By virtue of his office as a judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Judge Nixon is required to uphold the integrity of the judiciary to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, and to obey the laws of the United States.

Judge Nixon has raised substantial doubt as to his judicial integrity, undermined confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary betrayed the trust of the people of the United States, disobeyed the laws of the United States and brought disrepute on the Federal courts and the administration of justice by the Federal courts by the following:

After entering into an oil and gas investment with Wiley Fairchild, Judge Nixon conversed with Wiley Fairchild, Carroll Ingram, and Forrest County District Attorney Paul Holmes concerning the State criminal drug conspiracy prosecution of Drew Fairchild, the son of Wiley Fairchild, and thereafter concealed those conversations as follows:

(1) Judge Nixon concealed those conversations through one or more material false or misleading statements knowingly made to an attorney from the United States Department of Justice and a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation during an interview of Judge Nixon conducted in Biloxi, Mississippi, on April 19, 1984. The substance of the false or misleading statements included the following:

(A) Judge Nixon never discussed with Wiley Fairchild anything about Wiley's son's case.

(B) Wiley Fairchild never brought up his son's case.

(C) At the time of the interview Judge Nixon has no knowledge of the Drew Fairchild case and did not even know Drew Fairchild existed, except for what the judge previously read in the newspaper and what he learned from the questioners in the interview.

(D) Nothing was done or nothing was ever mentioned about Wiley Fairchild's son.

(E) Judge Nixon had never heard about the Drew Fairchild case, except what he told the questioners in the interview, and certainly had nothing to do with the case.

(F) Judge Nixon had done nothing to influence the Drew Fairchild case.

(G) State prosecutor Paul Holmes never talked to Judge Nixon about the Drew Fairchild case.

(2) Judge Nixon further concealed his conversations with Wiley Fairchild, Paul Homes, and Carroll Ingram concerning the Drew Fairchild case by knowingly giving one or more material false or misleading statements to a Federal grand jury during testimony under oath in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, on July 18, 1984. The substance of the false or misleading statements included the following:

(A) Paul Holmes never discussed the Drew Fairchild case with Judge Nixon.

(B) To the best of his knowledge and recollection, Judge Nixon did not know of any reason he would have met with Wiley Fairchild after the Nixon-Fairchild oil and gas investment was finalized in February 1981.

(C) Judge Nixon gave the grand jury all the information that he had and that he could, and he withheld nothing during his grand jury testimony.

(D) Judge Nixon had nothing whatsoever unofficially to do with the Drew Fairchild criminal case in State court.

(E) Judge Nixon never talked to anyone, including the State prosecutor, about the Drew Fairchild case.

(F) Judge Nixon never had a thing to do with the Drew Fairchild case at all.

(G) Judge Nixon "never talked to anyone, State or Federal, prosecutor or judge, in any way influence anybody" with respect to the Drew Fairchild case.

Wherefore, Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr. is guilty of an impeachable offense and should be removed from office.